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INTRODUCTION 
Johnny Vasquez-Algarin was at home in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania when 
Deputy U.S. Marshal Gary Duncan knocked on his door in 2010.1  Vasquez-
Algarin did not answer the knock immediately, while Deputy Marshal Dun-
can “heard a lot of movement inside,” including a phone ringing and a dog 
barking.2  But as quickly as the ringing and barking began, they stopped.3  
Suspicious, Deputy Marshal Duncan, officers from the Harrisburg Bureau of 
Police, and the Dauphin County Drug Task Force forcibly entered the home.4  
Moving inside, the officers identified sandwich baggies, a razor blade, and 
powdered cocaine.5  A broader search revealed ammunition, unused plastic 
bags, hundreds of small plastic bands, and car keys that opened a stolen car 
across the street.6  At his subsequent trial, Vasquez-Algarin moved to sup-
press the evidence from the search, but was unsuccessful.7  He was ultimately 
convicted on two drug counts.8  The rub?  Deputy Marshal Duncan never 
had a warrant to search Vasquez-Algarin’s home.  Instead, Deputy Marshal 
Duncan only had an arrest warrant for Edguardo Rivera—a suspect in a hom-
icide case—and a tip from another law enforcement officer that Rivera was 
staying with Vasquez-Algarin.9 
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 1 United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467, 46970 (3d Cir. 2016).  
 2 Id. at 470.  
 3 Id.  
 4 Id. at 46970. 
 5 Id. at 470. 
 6 Id.  Vasquez-Algarin did not give consent for the search, and one officer later obtained a search 
warrant while the remaining officers stayed in Vasquez-Algarin’s apartment. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 471. 
 9 Id. at 469.  
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I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Police10 in these situations are caught between two bright-line rules.  In 
Payton v. New York, the Court held that “an arrest warrant founded on prob-
able cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling 
in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is 
within.”11  But in Steagald v. United States, the Court held that police may 
not execute an arrest warrant in the home of a third person not named on the 
arrest warrant unless the police also have a search warrant for the third-per-
son’s home.12  This has led to an open question—how certain must police be 
that a suspect resides in a home before entering to execute an arrest warrant? 
The Third,13 Seventh,14 and Ninth15 Circuits have indicated that the 
Fourth Amendment requires an arrest warrant to arrest a suspect, and a 
search warrant to enter a third party’s home to execute the arrest warrant.  
 
 10 Throughout this paper, I will use the general terms “police” and “officers” to refer to all federal 
investigative branches of law enforcement.  These include the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Ex-
plosives (ATF), United States Secret Service (USSS), and Homeland Security Investigation 
(DHS/HSI).  While this paper focuses mainly on federal investigation, these terms also apply to 
state police as well, because the Fourth Amendment was incorporated against the states by the 
Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 11 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980).  For the purposes of this paper, I will call this the “Payton Standard.” 
 12 451 U.S. 204, 20506 (1981).  For the purposes of this paper, I will call this the “Steagald Stand-
ard.” The Supreme Court did leave open an exception for exigent circumstances and consent.  Id. 
at 215–16. The specific factual situation at issue in this paper assumes neither exigent circum-
stances nor consent are present.  
 13 Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d at 480 (“Given this precedent and the constitutional principles at stake, 
law enforcement armed with only an arrest warrant may not force entry into a home based on 
anything less than probable cause to believe an arrestee resides at and is then present within the 
residence.  A laxer standard would effect an end-run around the stringent baseline protection es-
tablished in Steagald and render all private homes—the most sacred of Fourth Amendment 
spaces—susceptible to search by dint of mere suspicion or uncorroborated information and without 
the benefit of any judicial determination.  Such intrusions are ‘the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’  We therefore join those Courts of Appeals that 
have held that reasonable belief in the Payton context ‘embodies the same standard of reasonable-
ness inherent in probable cause.’” (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371)).  
 14 United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating, in dicta, that “[w]ere we to 
reach the issue, we might be inclined to adopt the view of the narrow majority of our sister circuits 
that ‘reasonable belief’ is synonymous with probable cause.”). 
 15 United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We now hold that the ‘reason to 
believe,’ or reasonable belief, standard of Payton and Underwood embodies the same standard of 
reasonableness inherent in probable cause.”).  
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The First,16 Second,17 Fifth,18 Eighth,19 Tenth,20 Eleventh,21 and D.C.22 Cir-
cuits have held that officers must only have a “reasonable belief” that the 
suspect resides in the home to execute an arrest warrant for the suspect.  The 
Sixth Circuit has not taken a position on the issue.23 
This paper analyzes both positions, taking into consideration the text of 
the Fourth Amendment, the historical basis for the amendment, the balance 
of public and private interests, and the practical safeguards in place for each 
side.   Ultimately, probable cause is the correct standard because the reason-
able belief standard ignores the text and history of the Fourth Amendment, 
 
 16 United States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[W]here police entered a premises with 
both a warrant for an individual’s arrest and a reasonable belief that the individual resided at the 
premises entered. . . . Payton permits entry for the limited purpose of arresting the subject of the 
arrest warrant.”).  
 17 United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he proper inquiry is whether there is 
a reasonable belief that the suspect resides at the place to be entered to execute an arrest warrant, 
and whether the officers have reason to believe that the suspect is present.”). 
 18 United States v. Barrera, 464 F.3d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he court should review the district 
court’s determination that law enforcement officers had an objectively ‘reasonable belief’ that the 
individual mentioned in the arrest warrant resided at and was presently within a particular resi-
dence.”). 
 19 United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 217 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Based on the evidence presented, it is 
clear that [the officer’s] belief that [the suspect] resided [at the home] was, as a matter of law, 
reasonable, and thus the officers could enter the residence armed only with an arrest warrant for 
[the suspect].”). 
 20 Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 1999) (“This court finds the defendants were 
entitled to enter the [suspect’s] residence if there was a reasonable basis for believing that [the 
suspect] both (1) lived in the residence and (2) could be found within at the time of entry.  As to 
the level of knowledge required by the officers, the Supreme Court in Payton explicitly indicated 
that entry is permissible so long as there is ‘reason to believe the suspect is within.’  445 U.S. at 
603, 100 S.Ct. 1371.  There is no substantial reason to believe that the standard of knowledge 
should be different or greater when it comes to the other prong of the Payton test, whether the 
suspect resides at the house.  It would be curious indeed if the two prongs of the test were governed 
by two different standards of proof.”). 
 21 United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995) (“We think it sufficient to hold that 
in order for law enforcement officials to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for a resident 
of the premises, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, 
when viewed in the totality, must warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the 
suspect’s dwelling, and that the suspect is within the residence at the time of entry.”).  
 22 United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’g in part, 179 F. App’x 60 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (“We think it more likely, however, that the Supreme Court in Payton used a phrase 
other than ‘probable cause’ because it meant something other than ‘probable cause.’  Accordingly, 
we expressly hold that an officer executing an arrest warrant may enter a dwelling if he has only a 
‘reasonable belief,’ falling short of probable cause to believe, the suspect lives there and is present 
at the time.”).  
 23 United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 416 (6th Cir. 2008), expressly stated that the Sixth Circuit 
has not adopted a specific standard.  This contradicts United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 482 
(6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1283 (2007) (holding that “a lesser reasonable belief stand-
ard, and not probable cause, is sufficient to allow officers to enter a residence to enforce an arrest 
warrant”).  However, the analysis in Hardin suggests that the Sixth Circuit has never had to reach 
a decision on the issue because the facts of the cases before it have never rested somewhere in 
between reasonable belief and probable cause, so any resolution of the issue was merely dicta.  539 
F.3d at 410–11.  
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and the traditional safeguards of the Fourth Amendment are insufficient 
when the bar is lowered to a reasonable belief. 
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE BELIEF? 
Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment requires that police obtain a search 
warrant by demonstrating probable cause to a neutral magistrate.24  Police 
establish probable cause when “‘the facts and circumstances within their [the 
officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-
mation [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution 
in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”25  Police can 
circumvent the warrant requirement if the court has established a “well-de-
lineated” exception.26  The Supreme Court in Payton undoubtedly estab-
lished such an exception when it allowed officers to enter a suspect’s home 
without a search warrant to arrest the suspect.27 
Circuit courts have turned this into a two-pronged approach.  “In a Pay-
ton analysis, this court recognizes a two-prong test: officers must have a rea-
sonable belief the arrestee (1) lives in the residence, and (2) is within the 
residence at the time of entry.”28  The Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected 
this formulation, and would require probable cause instead of reasonable be-
lief,29 but many other circuits have adopted it.  Thus, it is essential to estab-
lish the difference between “information sufficient to warrant a man of rea-
sonable caution” that a suspect lives in a home, and a mere “reasonable 
belief” that a suspect lives in the home.30 
For example, the First Circuit in United States v. Graham looked at the 
totality of the information available to police before they entered a home to 
assess whether the police had a reasonable belief that the suspect resided in 
 
 24 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 25 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (alterations in original) (citing Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).  
 26 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 27 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 28 United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 
1220, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 29 United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the reason to believe 
standard “embodies the same standard of reasonableness inherent in probable cause.”). 
 30 For the purposes of this paper, I will not examine whether police have a reasonable belief that 
suspect “is within the residence at the time of entry” because the majority of cases focus on the first 
prong of the analysis as dispositive of the issue.  The suspect tends to be in the home. 
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the home.31  The defendant was on probation for drug offenses and connec-
tions to a violent neighborhood gang.32  The defendant violated his proba-
tion, and police obtained an arrest warrant.33  The defendant’s probation of-
ficer thought he was living with his mother, but was mistaken.34  A few 
months later, the defendant’s probation officer learned that the defendant 
was “staying at” a house in the neighborhood.35  When police arrived at the 
house to arrest the defendant, a woman denied that the defendant was pre-
sent, but police entered and found the defendant in a back room with clothes, 
toiletries, shoes, and other assorted personal artifacts.36  
Assessing whether the police had a reasonable belief that the defendant 
resided at the house, the First Circuit considered the totality of the circum-
stances and stated that “certain facts will almost always give rise to a reason-
able belief that the subject of an arrest warrant resides at the place entered.”37  
The police could point to five separate pieces of information to establish that 
belief.  That information included (1) a police report listing the house as the 
defendant’s address; (2) a probation officer’s statement that the defendant 
was “staying at” the house; (3) an identification by a witness outside the 
house that pointed at the house when police provided a picture of the defend-
ant; (4) the probation officer’s connection between the defendant and other 
gang members the probation officer knew to reside at the house; and (5) the 
police’s inability to find the defendant at his previous address.38  The First 
Circuit also refused to assess what police found after they entered the house; 
only information available to the police prior to entry could be used to justify 
the reasonable belief.39  
Courts applying the probable cause standard appear to be more stringent.  
In United States v. Gorman, the Ninth Circuit suggested that police who re-
lied on the suspect’s friend to provide the location of a home and later iden-
tified the suspect’s car outside the home could possibly demonstrate “rea-
sonable suspicion,” but did not meet a probable cause standard.40   Another 
court has held that a tip from a confidential informant and eyewitness iden-
tification are not sufficient to establish even a reasonable belief.41  However, 
 
 31 United States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 32 Id. at 10. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 10–11. 
 37 Id. at 13. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 14 (noting that “[t]his Monday-morning quarterbacking does nothing . . . [w]hat the police 
discovered after they entered the apartment cannot help us determine what the officers could have 
reasonably believed before entering”). 
 40 314 F.3d 1105, 1107–08, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 41 United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 407–08, 420 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a general descrip-
tion from a confidential informant and an eyewitness identification by an apartment manager were 
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one court has found that police can rely on an anonymous tip and a witness 
identification to establish probable cause.42  
Overall, the majority of courts applying the reasonable belief standard 
consider the totality of evidence available to police at the time of entry.  For 
example, police may rely on their own observations,43 confidential inform-
ants,44 the suspect’s own statements,45 local police departments and federal 
investigative agencies,46 eyewitnesses,47 and successful contact with the sus-
pect at the address in question.48  
 
 
insufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the suspect was a resident). 
 42 United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that an anonymous tip and 
identification of the suspect by the suspect’s girlfriend in the lobby of her apartment building con-
stituted probable cause). 
 43 United States v. Barrera, 464 F.3d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding reasonable belief when officers 
observed the suspect’s cars at the residence in question); Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1227 
(10th Cir. 1999) (finding a reasonable belief based, in part, on a Bureau of Indian Affair’s officer’s 
observations that the suspect’s truck was located at the residence in question). 
 44 United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 217 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding a reasonable belief based on 
information from a confidential informant that the suspect was living in the home); United States 
v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding a reasonable belief when a confidential infor-
mation whose father owner the apartment building told ATF agents where in the building the sus-
pect was living and that the suspect was unemployed and slept late); United States v. Magluta, 44 
F.3d 1530, 1532, 1538 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding a reasonable belief when a confidential informant 
gave U.S. Marshals a map showing the location of the suspect’s residence and identified a smaller 
residence on the premises). 
 45 Risse, 83 F.3d at 216–17 (finding a reasonable belief when the suspect told police herself that she 
was “staying with” the homeowner, even though the suspect maintained a permanent residence 
elsewhere). 
 46 United States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding a reasonable belief in part based 
on information from a Boston Police Department report of domestic violence that listed the sus-
pect’s residence as the home in question); Barrera, 464 F.3d at 504 (finding that arrest records 
listing the residence in question as the suspect’s address supported a reasonable belief that the 
suspect lived at the residence); United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 285–86 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(finding that police merely stating that they have performed an investigation amounts to a “system-
atic official inquiry” when the only information available to police was the suspect’s address on 
file as a condition of his parole); Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1226–27 (holding that information from the 
local police department that the suspect “comes into the city on weekends, does a burglary or two 
then goes back [home],” information from Bureau of Indian Affairs officers that the suspect lives 
with his mother, and information from the officer’s personal observations about the location of the 
suspect’s truck to be sufficient to establish a reasonable belief). 
 47 Graham, 553 F.3d at 10 (finding a reasonable belief when a person who answered the outer door 
to a building sees a picture of the suspect and directs police to the residence in question); Magluta, 
44 F.3d at 1532 (finding a reasonable belief when U.S. Marshals secured a positive identification 
from the suspect’s afternoon guard).  
 48 Risse, 83 F.3d at 217 (finding that successful contact with the suspect twice at the residence in 
question, and an unsuccessful attempt to contact the suspect at a different residence, were sufficient 
to establish reasonable belief). 
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III. ADVOCATING FOR THE REASONABLE BELIEF (“PAYTON”) STANDARD 
Practical implications and the modern Fourth Amendment suggest that 
the Payton reasonable belief standard should apply.  When police have al-
ready demonstrated probable cause to a neutral magistrate that a suspect has 
committed a felony, that probable cause should suffice to justify a search for 
the suspect.  Moreover, the exclusionary rule and Bivens actions provide sig-
nificant protection to enforce the Fourth Amendment. 
A. Police Have Already Demonstrated Probable Cause to a Neutral 
Magistrate 
This question centers on the specific scenario in which police have al-
ready obtained an arrest warrant for a suspect.  Thus, police have already 
demonstrated to a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to arrest the 
suspect. The Supreme Court said just that in Payton: 
It is true that an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than 
a search warrant requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate’s 
determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen.  
If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to per-
suade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally rea-
sonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the law.  Thus, for 
Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause 
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which 
the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.49 
This position makes sense for a number of reasons.  First, using an arrest 
warrant plus a reasonable belief saves a time when officers only have to go 
to the magistrate once.50  Second, probable cause itself is a doctrine of rea-
sonableness, not certainty.51  Third, why should criminals benefit from a 
higher standard when they are potentially harboring subjects of an arrest war-
rant for whom police have already demonstrated probable cause to believe 
that a crime was committed?  The Fourth Amendment protects privacy, not 
places.52  And there are substantial penalties in place for harboring aliens and 
other fugitives from justice,53 which indicates that the federal government 
 
 49 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602–03 (1980). 
 50 Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1534–35 (quoting United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978). 
 51 Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1534–35.  See also infra note 105 (discussing the use of reasonable belief to 
define probable cause). 
 52 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967), superseded by statute, Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212–223 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (1968)).  
 53 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (harboring aliens); 18 U.S.C. §§ 751–753, 755–757 (the escape and res-
cue provisions); 18 U.S.C. § 1071 (concealing a person from arrest); 18 U.S.C. § 1072 (concealing 
an escaped prisoner); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1073–74 (flight to avoid prosecution or giving testimony pro-
visions). 
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does not feel that privacy interests are to be given the same effect when aid-
ing criminal behavior is at play. 
B. Sufficient Criminal and Civil Safeguards are in Place 
Separate criminal and civil safeguards are in place to remedy any poten-
tial Fourth Amendment violation by overzealous police officers using only 
the Payton reasonable belief standard.  In criminal cases, the exclusionary 
rule enforces the Fourth Amendment.  On the civil side, individuals may re-
cover money damages from federal officials via Bivens actions. Returning to 
the Vasquez-Algarin case, two separate remedies were available. 
1. The Exclusionary Rule 
On the criminal side, the exclusionary rule allowed Vasquez-Algarin to 
challenge the constitutionality of the search by police and suppress the evi-
dence at trial.54  The exclusionary rule, at its core, states that “all evidence 
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . in-
admissible in . . . court.”55  The exclusionary rule applies to all investigative 
officials, federal, state, and local.56  There are two distinct rationales for the 
exclusionary rule: promoting “judicial integrity” and deterring “future con-
stitutional violations.”57  However, the Court has limited its analysis to only 
the second rationale.58  In theory, the exclusionary rule should deter police 
from searching every single house on the block to find a suspect for whom 
they have an arrest warrant.59  And in theory, the exclusionary rule should 
protect those homeowners that suffer Fourth Amendment violations at the 
hands of police if the police do end up searching every single house on the 
block.  
Police will likely have to justify their reasonable belief at a suppression 
 
 54 Vasquez-Algarin did move to suppress the evidence obtained during Deputy Marshall’s search at 
his trial.  United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467, 470–471 (3d Cir. 2016).  The trial court 
denied the motion to suppress, and Vasquez-Algarin appealed to the Third Circuit, which ultimately 
reversed the District Court’s denial of Vasquez-Algarin’s motion to suppress and vacated his con-
viction.  Id. at 470–71, 484.  
 55 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), abrogated by United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 56 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (incorporating the exclusionary rule against the states via the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments). 
 57 THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 185 (2009) (analyzing the 
reasoning from Mapp). 
 58 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (“First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct 
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.  Second, there exists no evidence sug-
gesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment . . . 
Third . . . [we don’t think] that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a sig-
nificant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate.”). 
 59 Cf. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 198–200 (4th Cir. 1966) (detailing how police searched 
over 300 homes attempting to execute a single arrest warrant). 
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hearing.  In the Vasquez-Algarin example, the defendant moved to exclude 
all evidence found as a result of the police’s search at trial.60  Deputy Marshal 
Duncan had to testify at the suppression hearing, where he stated that the 
“exact factors” that led to his reasonable belief that Edguardo Rivera was a 
resident at Vasquez-Algarin’s home included information from another law 
enforcement officer and information from street informants.61  Cross-exam-
ination revealed, however, that Deputy Marshal Duncan never verified the 
renter of the apartment.62  Moreover, at trial, Deputy Marshal Duncan testi-
fied that “[t]he address was not the address of record for Mr. Rivera, so we 
wanted to knock and attempt to gain contact with somebody inside and gain 
their consent to search the address.”63  Based on these inconsistencies in 
Deputy Marshal Duncan’s statements—the changed story, the lack of hard 
evidence demonstrating that Rivera was a resident of the apartment, and the 
substantial reliance on the shuffling sounds when Deputy Marshal Duncan 
knocked on the door—the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s denial 
of Vasquez-Algarin’s motion to suppress and vacated his conviction.64  
Admittedly, the Third Circuit held Deputy Marshal Duncan to a probable 
cause standard for his belief that Rivera was a resident.  However, the rea-
soning may be extrapolated to the reasonable belief standard.  This example 
demonstrates that legal safeguards are in place after police execute an arrest 
warrant. 
Winning a suppression motion is far from guaranteed.  And although 
criminal defendants face difficulties winning suppression motions, those are 
not the only reason that a reasonable belief standard does not adequately rep-
resent the Fourth Amendment.  Concerns about the continued viability of the 
exclusionary rule suggest that the Steagald probable cause standard should 
win out.  First, not all judges support the idea of the exclusionary rule.65  The 
rule is not found in the text of the Fourth Amendment.  Thus, it is a judicially-
created remedy.66  The Senate even held hearings in the 1980s to decide 
whether to reform or repeal the exclusionary rule.67  Although the Supreme 
 
 60 United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467, 470 (3d Cir. 2016).  . 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id.  
 63 Id. at 471.  
 64 Id. at 480–84. 
 65 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (“Suppression of evidence . . . has always 
been our last resort, not our first impulse.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984) 
(pointing to empirical evidence that shows a large number of felons are released because evidence 
is excluded from trial).  
 66 “This rule of evidence did not come from on high.  It’s man-made, not God-given . . . . It’s not even 
in the Constitution.” Charles McC. Mathias Jr., The Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 28 LOY. L. REV. 
1, 7 (1982) (quoting Judge Malcolm Wilkey). 
 67 The Exclusionary Rule Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, on S.101, S.751 and S.1995, 97th Cong., 1 (1982). 
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Court has never officially repealed the exclusionary rule, the Court has con-
sistently limited the rule since its “high water mark” in the 1960s.68  For 
example,  
The Burger Court consider[ed] the exclusionary rule as a strictly prophylac-
tic, judicially created device legitimate only to the extent that it deters un-
lawful police conduct.  It is not, in this view, an inherent or necessary part 
of the fourth amendment; rather, it is one of many possible remedial devices 
theoretically available to protect and preserve fourth amendment interests.69 
Consequently, the exclusionary rule is not ironclad.  The Court has called 
it merely a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amend-
ment rights generally through a deterrent effect, rather than a personal con-
stitutional right of the party aggrieved.”70  Moreover, “the rule has never 
been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all pro-
ceedings against all persons,” and should be “restricted to those areas where 
its remedial objectives are most efficaciously served.”71  While courts would 
likely find that the remedial objective—here, deterring police from entering 
homes without a search warrant and encouraging them to first obtain the 
search warrant—to apply in cases like Vasquez-Algarin’s, the continued 
skepticism of the exclusionary rule in general casts doubt on the sufficiency 
of the remedy. 
The rule is not absolute either.  In fact, the Court has stated that whether 
application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate is to “be resolved by 
weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution’s 
case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence” against an insuffi-
cient warrant, or a lack of a warrant altogether.72  So, hypothetically, if police 
enter a third-party’s home and find significant evidence of criminal activity, 
the third party’s interests are only to be weighed by a judge; the Fourth 
Amendment rights are not absolute.73  The trend of the Roberts Court has 
been to find more situations where the costs of exclusion are too high.74  
 
 68 MCINNIS, supra note 57, at 186. 
 69 John. M. Burkhoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Incon-
sistent Doctrine, 58 OREGON L. REV. 151, 152 (1979).  
 70 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).  
 71 Id. 
 72 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906–07 (1984). 
 73 Police tend to find lots of evidence of illegal activity when they enter homes.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2009)  (finding a shotgun and various types of ammuni-
tion in violation of the defendant’s parole); United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 408, 420 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (finding three firearms, crack cocaine, marijuana, and approximately $2,000 in cash); 
United States v. Barrera, 464 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding two firearms and $10,000 in 
cash); United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding three mailbox keys 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1704 and several checks made out to other people in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1708); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding a loaded shotgun 
and bag of ammunition to charge the defendant with felon in possession of a firearm under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). 
 74 MCINNIS, supra note 57, at 211.  The Roberts Court has also allowed the prosecution to use tainted 
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Last, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would also likely 
subvert the protections that the rule should provide in cases like Vasquez-
Algarin’s.  Allowing police to use only their reasonable belief as a substitute 
for a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate opens up a whole host of 
possibilities.  Just as “[t]he discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid war-
rant was unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant,”75 
the discovery of facts demonstrating that an officer’s reasonable belief was 
unnecessarily broad could serve as a broad good-faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule and essentially kill the application of the rule.  The Court has 
already demonstrated a willingness to expand the good faith exception.76 
The application of the exclusionary rule is too tenuous to justify the lower 
Payton reasonable belief standard.  The Supreme Court in Steagald summed 
up the problems with the exclusionary rule the best:  
Indeed, if suppression motions and damages actions were sufficient to im-
plement the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, there would be no need for the constitutional requirement that 
in the absence of exigent circumstances a warrant must be obtained for a 
home arrest or a search of a home for objects.  We have instead concluded 
that in such cases the participation of a detached magistrate in the probable-
cause determination is an essential element of a reasonable search or sei-
zure.77 
While the exclusionary rule is good in theory, it is not sufficient to justify 
such a broad exception to the warrant requirement here.  
2. Bivens Actions 
On the civil side, Vasquez-Algarin could bring a Bivens action against 
specific federal officers for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights.  In a 
Bivens action, a plaintiff sues federal officers directly in their individual ca-
pacities for violations of constitutional rights.78  A Bivens action is analogous 
to a § 1983 action brought against state and local employees for violations 
of enumerated federal rights.79  The remedy in a Bivens action is monetary 
 
evidence in its case-in-chief.  Id. 
 75 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987). 
 76 See MCINNIS, supra note 57, at 205–11. 
 77 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215–16 (1981). 
 78 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389, 392 (1971). 
The name of the action is based on the name of the case.  Id.   
 79 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law.”).  A plaintiff in a § 1983 case must overcome qualified 
immunity of the local officials.  See, e.g., Karen Blum et al., Qualified Immunity Developments: 
Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633 (2013).  A civil plaintiff could also sue 
for injunctive relief to prevent state and local officials from continuing the warrantless searches.  
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damages.80  
In theory, a Bivens action could provide adequate relief.  But when a 
Bivens action is paired with the Payton reasonable belief standard, it be-
comes almost impossible for a plaintiff to recover.  For example, Rosanna 
Valdez sued FBI Special Agent Samuel Michael McPheters and Bureau of 
Indian Affairs Police Officer Gregory Littlewhiteman (collectively, “the Of-
ficers”) in a Bivens action, alleging that the Officers violated her Fourth 
Amendment rights when they searched her home for her son, Raymond.81  
The Officers returned to the Valdez residence at least twice looking to arrest 
Raymond.82  The Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment to the Officers because the Officers were able to demonstrate 
that they had a reasonable belief—and thus qualified immunity—that Ray-
mond resided with Rosanna.83  The Officers were awarded summary judg-
ment even though Rosanna denied that Raymond lived with her, and even 
though the fact sheet prepared in connection with the investigation listed 
Raymond’s address as “transient.”84  This case demonstrates how difficult it 
is for a plaintiff to win in a Bivens action.  
Critics of this Bivens will also note that, while it was presumably codified 
in the Westfall Act,85 there appears to be an open question as to whether 
Bivens is still viable.86  The Supreme Court has been skeptical of Bivens ac-
tions recently, and has taken steps to limit their use.87  This skepticism is not 
 
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 162 (1908).  Suits for prospective injunctive relief are difficult, 
however, because the plaintiff must prove that there is a sufficiently plausible threat of future in-
jury.  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 11112 (1983).  Lyons sued the city of Los 
Angeles after police placed him in a chokehold and rendered him unconscious.  Id. at 97–98.  The 
Court found that, for Lyons to have standing to sue the city, he needed to show “either (1) 
that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an 
encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation, or for questioning, or (2) that the 
City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner.”  Id. at 106.  For a longer discus-
sion of injunctive relief under the Lyons analysis, see Linda E. Fisher, Caging Lyons: The Availa-
bility of Injunctive Relief in Section 1983 Actions, 18 LOYOLA U. CHI. L. J. 1085 (1987). 
 80 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 
 81 Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1222 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1225–28. 
 84 Id. at 122728. 
 85 Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 
2679(b)).  See also James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Con-
stitutional Adjudication, 98 GEORGETOWN L. J. 117, 132 (2009) (noting that “the statute suggests 
that any alleged violation of the Constitution will support a claim against federal officials.  In other 
words, the statute  . . . presumes a right to sue so long as the plaintiff alleges a constitutional viola-
tion.”). 
 86 Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, The Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens 
Question, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 509, 570–83 (2013) (analyzing the possibility that the Westfall 
Act precludes Bivens actions when state tort law remedies are available).  
 87 Lyle Denniston, New curb on Bivens remedy?, SCOTUSBLOG (May 16, 2011), http://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2011/05/new-curb-on-bivens-remedy/ (noting that the Supreme Court has only ex-
panded Bivens remedies twice in the past 40 years).  See also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Bivens Term: 
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new.  Chief Justice Burger dissented in Bivens.88  He would have “(1) 
waive[d] sovereign immunity for law enforcement officers who commit il-
legal acts in the performance of their duties; (2) create[d] a cause of action 
for damages resulting from such illegal actions; (3) create[d] a quasi-judicial 
tribunal to adjudicate damages for such claims; (4) clarif[ied] that this pro-
cess would be in lieu of exclusion of evidence; and (5) provide[d] that no 
evidence be excluded from criminal trials due to violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.”89  However, there is no evidence to suggest that any of Chief 
Justice Burger’s recommendations will take effect, so plaintiffs are left with 
Bivens as the only remedy against federal officials.  Requiring federal offic-
ers to demonstrate probable cause will raise the bar for federal officers to 
receive qualified immunity, and hopefully make Bivens somewhat viable as 
a remedy. 
C. Concluding the Reasonable Belief Arguments 
In sum, there are viable arguments to suggest that the reasonable belief 
standard is the correct interpretation of Payton and Steagald.  The Payton 
opinion explained why probable cause for an arrest warrant should suffice 
for search warrants.  Moreover, the exclusionary rule and Bivens actions are 
criminal and civil safeguards against overzealous police officers.  And at the 
most basic level, a reasonable belief just lets officers do their jobs: 
More importantly, requiring actual knowledge of the suspect’s true resi-
dence would effectively make Payton at dead letter.  In the real world, peo-
ple do not live in individual, separate, hermetically-sealed residences.  They 
live with other people, they move from one residence to another.  Requiring 
that the suspect actually reside at the residence entered would mean that of-
ficers could never rely on Payton, since they could never be certain that the 
suspect had not moved out the previous day and that a Bivens or a 42 USC 
§ 1983 claim would then be made against them by another resident.90  
Despite all of these valid reasons to advocate for the reasonable belief 
standard, many problems still exist with that interpretation. 
 
Why the Supreme Court Should Reinvigorate Damages Suits Against Federal Officers, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY (Jan. 2017), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/de-
fault/files/The_Bivens_Term.pdf (noting that “[i]n recent years, however, lower courts have . . . 
left a growing array of plaintiffs (with meritorious constitutional claims) with no legal remedies 
whatsoever.”).  
 88 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 89 MCINNIS, supra note 57, at 194 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 422-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).  
 90 Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1225. 
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IV. ADVOCATING FOR THE PROBABLE CAUSE (“STEAGALD”) STANDARD 
Prior to the 1981 Steagald decision, commentators identified three rea-
sons why the Court should impose a search warrant requirement when police 
execute an arrest warrant in a third-party’s home.  They were concerned that 
(1) requiring only an arrest warrant and reasonable belief ignores the distinc-
tion between arrest and search warrants; (2) the Supreme Court has only read 
in narrow exceptions to the broad protections of the Fourth Amendment; and 
(3) the balance between private interests and government interests tilts to-
ward private interests.91  A fourth reason, the historical basis of the Fourth 
Amendment, is also relevant.  Each of these rationales is applicable to the 
distinction at issue after Steagald and merit discussion here.  
A. Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants are Different 
The Fourth Amendment reads:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.92 
 The pertinent portion of the Fourth Amendment for the purposes of this 
discussion is the phrase “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”93  
Despite this general reference to “warrants,” there is a distinct difference 
between search warrants and arrest warrants.94  Search warrants must de-
scribe the places to be searched and things to be seized, and may be issued 
to find (1) evidence of a crime; (2) contraband, fruits of crime, or other items 
illegally possessed; (3) property designed for use, intended for use, or used 
in committing a crime; or (4) a person to be arrested or a person who is 
unlawfully restrained.95  The fact that the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure identify the possibility of receiving a search warrant for “a person to be 
arrested” indicates that the arrest warrant itself is not sufficient to search for 
a person to be arrested.  To allow reasonable belief to substitute for probable 
cause essentially merges the two together and allows an arrest warrant to 
 
 91 Linda Imes, Arresting a Suspect in a Third Party’s Home: What is Reasonable?, 72 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMONOLOGY 293 (1981).  
 92 U.S. CONST. amend IV.  
 93 Id. (emphasis added). 
 94 Imes, supra note 91, at 298.  See also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981) (explain-
ing that “[a]n arrest warrant . . . primarily serves to protect an individual from an unreasonable 
seizure” while a search warrant “safeguards an individual’s interest in the privacy of his home and 
possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police”). 
 95 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c)(1)–(4) (emphasis added). 
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substitute for a search warrant.96  But this interpretation violates the rule 
against surplusage.97  Indeed, “[the words in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure] cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used.”98  
Therefore, proponents of the Payton reasonable belief standard ignore the 
distinction between the two types of warrants present in both the Fourth 
Amendment and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
B. “Reasonableness” Has Been Expanded Too Far  
Allowing officers to execute a search without a warrant or other excep-
tion is a direct assault on the text of the Fourth Amendment.  “The whole 
thrust of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Articles of the Bill of Rights which [the 
Framers] appended to the Constitution was to set limits for law enforcement-
-even at some sacrifice of efficiency.”99  By allowing police to cut corners 
like in Vasquez-Algarin’s situation, courts are increasing the exceptions to 
the warrant requirement for the sake of “reasonableness.”  The text of the 
Fourth Amendment sets a warrant as the normative baseline for a search. 
Searches conducted without a warrant need a specific exception: 
Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the Fourth 
Amendment requires adherence to the judicial processes […] and that 
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.100 
But the Supreme Court in Payton did not explicitly delineate this excep-
tion for police to execute warrants in third-party homes.  The language from 
Payton reads “for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded 
on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a 
dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the sus-
pect is within.”101  There are three issues with reading Payton to require only 
a reasonable belief standard.  First, Payton itself says the rule is “limited.”102  
 
 96 See infra Section V(d) regarding general warrants. 
 97 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect . . . . None 
should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have 
no consequence.”). 
 98 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). 
 99 Foreword, ALAN BARTH, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY at X (1961).  
 100 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  For a longer discussion of the various exceptions, 
see MCINNIS, supra note 57, at 75–114 (detailing the exceptions to the warrant requirement as 
exigent circumstances, searches incident to lawful arrest, hot pursuit, plain view, nonexigent 
searches, consent, community caretaking, open fields, border searches, searches at sea, pervasively 
regulated industries, and individuals on parole). 
 101 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). 
 102 Id. 
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This suggests that the expansion of the doctrine by the Circuit Courts is im-
proper. 
Second, the “reason to believe” language only modifies the “suspect is 
within” portion of the rule; the dwelling language precedes the “reason to 
believe” language.  And where “the syntax involves something other than a 
parallel series of nouns or verbs, a prepositive or postpositive modifier nor-
mally applies only to the nearest reasonable referent.”103  The language “to 
enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe 
the suspect is within” demonstrates such a case.  “When there is reason to 
believe” refers only to “the suspect is within,” not “dwelling in which the 
suspect lives.”  Therefore, the two-prong test advocated by all of the Payton 
reasonable belief courts is flawed. 
Third, the Supreme Court uses language like “reason to believe” to refer 
to probable cause.104  For example, in Maryland v. Pringle, the Supreme 
Court uses reasonable belief to define probable cause.105  Thus, reasonable 
belief can be differentiated from the lower reasonable suspicion standard.106  
Some argue that if the Supreme Court in Payton meant probable cause when 
it stated reasonable belief, it would have used the phrase probable cause.107  
But the argument here is not that Payton is incorrect; the argument is that 
Payton is limited in scope to only those situations in which officers have 
probable cause that a suspect resides in a home, and a reasonable belief that 
the suspect is in the home.  That interpretation conforms to the text of the 
rule outlined in Payton while likewise preserving the heart of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
C. The Balance Between Public and Private Interests Favors the Public 
In Steagald, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, balanced the bur-
den on police officers to obtain a search warrant against an individual’s right 
to be free of unjustified intrusions.108  Without much analysis, Justice Mar-
shall concluded that the right to privacy outweighed the burden on police 
 
 103 Scalia & Garner, supra note 97, at 152.  Scalia and Garner call label this the “nearest-reasonable-
referent canon.” 
 104 United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 490 (6th Cir. 2006) (Clay, J., concurring) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 105 124 S.Ct. 795, 800 (2003) (“We have stated . . . that ‘the substance of all the definitions of probable 
cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 
(1983))).  
 106 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (treating probable cause as a higher 
standard than reasonable suspicion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (allowing police officers 
to stop and frisk individuals without probable cause when the officers have reason to believe the 
individuals may be “armed and dangerous”).  
 107 See, e.g., Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 484 (reasoning that, by using both “reason to believe” and “probable 
cause,” the Supreme Court “indicate[d] that it intended different standards to apply” to the terms).  
 108 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221–22 (1981) (“Whatever practical problems remain . . . 
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because when “police know the location of the felon when they obtain an 
arrest warrant, the additional burden of obtaining a search warrant at the 
same time is miniscule.”109  Justice Marshall was likewise dismissive of the 
burden on police in situations where police first have an arrest warrant and 
later learn the location of the suspect.110  Police, when they establish probable 
cause of a suspect’s location, suffer minimal harm from waiting to get a 
search warrant.  Police can stake out the exits of a home in the short amount 
of time it takes to get the warrant.  Police do not even need to leave the 
scene—telephonic search warrants are a distinct possibility.111 
Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent in Steagald, also used a balancing 
test, but analyzed a different set of factors.112  Framing the issue as a question 
of reasonableness, Justice Rehnquist noted that fugitives are inherently mo-
bile, and that “police officers will generally have no way of knowing whether 
the subject of an arrest warrant will be at the dwelling when they return from 
seeking a search warrant.”113  Further, the suggestion that police simply stake 
out the residence while they wait for a search warrant is “beguilingly sim-
ple”114 because “the costs of such a stakeout seem[] excessive in an era of 
rising crime and scarce political resources.”115 
While the concerns surrounding police efficiency are duly noted, they are 
not dispositive of this issue.  Exigent circumstances and hot pursuit are two 
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement that serve to mitigate 
those efficiency concerns.116  Moreover, the probable cause standard does 
not necessarily mean that police will always have to seek out a warrant be-
fore executing the search.  Even the Ninth Circuit—the strongest advocate 
of the probable cause standard—has recognized that officers may justify 
their probable cause after the fact at a suppression hearing.117  Therefore, 
 
cannot outweigh the constitutional interests at stake.”). 
 109 Id. at 222. 
 110 Id. (“[I]f the police know of the location of the felon when they obtain an arrest warrant, the addi-
tional burden of obtaining a search warrant at the same time is miniscule.”).   
 111 Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 41(d)(3).  
 112 Steagald, 451 U.S. at 224 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Resolution of that issue depends upon a 
balancing of the ‘need to search against the invasion which the search entails.’” (quoting Camara 
v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967))). 
 113 Id. at 225.  
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. at 22526 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 619 (White, J., dissenting)). 
 116 See, e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (police may enter a home without a 
search warrant to preserve life or avoid serious injury); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) 
(police may enter a home without a search warrant when in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon). 
 117 United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 111112 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Gordon’s motion 
to suppress the fruit of a warrantless search could only succeed if the officers “did not have reason 
to believe that Gorman was present in [the] home” when they conducted the search); cf. Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (“[T]he after-the-event justification for the arrest or search is a far 
less reliable procedure than an objective predetermination of probable cause because it is influ-
enced by the shortcomings of hindsight judgment.”). 
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under the probable cause standard, police do not have their hands tied behind 
their back. They are just held to the normal search standard. 
D. The Fourth Amendment was Drafted to Prevent Police From Issuing 
General Warrants 
Fourth Amendment analysis is one of reasonableness.118  In a reasona-
bleness analysis, the Fourth Amendment “simply requires that each and 
every search or seizure be reasonable.”119  Nowhere in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment is there a third clause stating “warrantless searches and seizures 
are inherently unreasonable.”120  Therefore, requiring only a reasonable be-
lief that a suspect resides in a home before executing an arrest warrant pur-
suant to Payton comports with the Fourth Amendment. 
But the Katz reasonableness analysis is just a judicial fiction.121  To truly 
understand the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, one must consider the 
reasons for which it was passed because “[t]he meaning of the constitution 
is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not different at any subsequent time 
when a court has occasion to pass upon it.”122  
British officials were allowed to use general warrants, which gave them 
broad discretion in searches.123  Officials seeking these warrants did not need 
to be supported by oath or affirmation, they did not need to explain the basis 
of their suspicions, nor did they have to limit the warrants to a single loca-
tion.124  However, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Brit-
ish legal theorists criticized the use of general warrants, and general warrants 
were eventually outlawed.125 
As the American states sought independence from England, the early 
state constitutions rejected general warrants in three ways.  First, the positive 
right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects meant that gov-
ernment officials were prohibited from a promiscuous search and seizure.126  
 
 118 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 801 
(1994). 
 119 Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 53, 55 (1996). 
 120 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: A GRAND TOUR OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 
232 (2015). 
 121 Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law Criminal 
Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”-”Fourth Amendment Reasonableness” Is Only 
A Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 56 (2010). 
 122 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 55 (2d ed. 1871). 
 123 MCINNIS, supra note 57, at 15. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1196–220 (2016) 
(explaining the evolution of the English law with regard to general warrants). 
 126 Id. at 1264.  
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Second, particularized warrants—not general warrants—became the only 
way the government could enter the home besides actively pursuing fel-
ons.127  Third, states outlined the specific information government officials 
would have to provide to get a search warrant, including the information “to 
be presented, by whom, which procedures would have to be followed, and 
who could issue warrants for them to be considered valid.”128  These three 
issues became the basis for the Fourth Amendment.129 
The Supreme Court, when analyzing the historical basis of the Fourth 
Amendment, has suggested that the only exception to the broad warrant pro-
tections found at common law was hot pursuit.130  The Court did not extend 
that exception for police to search a third-party’s home because “[a]rmed 
solely with an arrest warrant for a single person, the police could search all 
the homes of that individual’s friends and acquaintances”131 and “an arrest 
warrant may serve as the pretext for entering a home in which the police have 
a suspicion, but not probable cause to believe, that illegal activity is taking 
place.”132  Allowing the Payton reasonable belief standard to take effect es-
sentially turns an arrest warrant into a search warrant.  This merger makes 
the arrest warrant a general warrant that the Founders found so repugnant.  
“Under a Republican Constitution, to ensure that [police] remain within their 
just powers, . . . lawmaking power must itself be limited by law.”133  The 
Fourth Amendment needs to be the limit here—the Amendment requires 
probable cause, nothing less. 
CONCLUSION 
Johnny Vasquez-Algarin was caught in a tough spot.  U.S. Marshals and 
other local law enforcement entered his home without a search warrant to 
search for someone else.  Vasquez-Algarin undoubtedly possessed drug par-
aphernalia, and had the police followed proper procedures, all of that drug 
paraphernalia would be admissible evidence at trial.  His case illustrates the 
fundamental tension between the need for police to be able to do their job 
and the right to privacy in one’s own home.  Police should be required to 
demonstrate probable cause to a neutral magistrate and acquire a search war-
rant before executing an arrest warrant in a third-party’s home.  Allowing 
police to use only their reasonable belief returns law enforcement back to the 
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 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217–19 (1981) (citing Semanye’s Case, 5 Co.Rep. 91a, 
92b–93a (K.B. 1603)). 
 131 Id. at 215 (citing Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 197 (4th Cir. 1966)). 
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days of general warrants and the British government.  While there are un-
doubted governmental interests in using the reasonable belief standard—in-
cluding time and cost efficiency—the availability of exigent circumstances 
and other exceptions to the warrant requirement mitigates those needs se-
verely. 
